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A pervasive new form of governance is burgeoning in practice in the public sector –
networks. Networks are an increasingly common way public sector organizations can come
together to achieve a purpose (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). While networks have become
more common in the practice, academics have also become keen to study these new
organizational forms. However while research has accrued on networks rapidly, a great
deal of it has been descriptive in nature (Provan et. al., 2007). Descriptive networks
research has aided academic understanding of what networks are as well as the purpose
for which networks are instituted. However, only few empirical findings have
demonstrated the relationship between networks and what it is done in the public sector.
That is, what impact does the network have itself? Provan et. al. (2007) define this as whole
networks research. The purpose of researching whole networks is to understand the impact
of network level factors on the work of the network. This research carefully studies one
network for the purpose of understanding the impact of network level factors on the work
of networks.
Why Networks?
Networks can simply be described as: “a more or less stable pattern of social
relations between mutual dependent actors, which form around a policy, program, and/ or
cluster of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through series of games”
(Koopenjan and Klijn, 2004, pp. 69-70). Networks emerge as a way to structure relations
between multiple organizations that is different that hierarchy. Ostrom and Ostrom (1971)
argue that “the best structures for satisfying individual preferences are not centralized
bureaucratic agencies, but rather more fragmented, multi-organizational arrangements” (in
Denhardt and Denhardt, 2009 p. 175). Similarly the “New Public Administration”
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movement heralded the importance of inclusive strategies for governing (Denhardt and
Denahrdt, 2009). Such movements laid the groundwork of the increasing demands for
networked government. However, the increase in networks while receiving considerable
academic attentions, has still yet to overwhelming study the impact networks have on what
is done.
Whole Networks
The disconnect between assumptions made about networks and empirical evidence
demonstrating the positive impacts of networks, Provan et. al. (2007) explain, is a lack of
research at the network level of analysis. Provan et al. (2007) suggest most of the research
on networks has focused on the properties of networks. For instance, “what networks are,
how they are structured, how they operate, and even how they develop” (p. 480). For
example, Arganoff and McGuire (2003) have shown differences between networks and
hierarchies exist. Also, the skills public managers need to operate in networks differ from
those in hierarchies (McGuire, 2002). Despite this important research area and the
increasing information that is being generated, Provan et. al. (2007) argue there is an
aspect of networks that has been understudied, what they call “whole networks.”
Whole networks research focuses on “inter-organizational networks at the network
level, rather than the organizational level of analysis” (Provan et. al., 2007, p. 480). Provan
et. al. (2007) provides a specific definition of whole networks: “a group of three or more
organizations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal…formally
established and governed and goal directed rather than occurring serendipitously.” (p.
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482). The authors go on to describe the relationships that exist among organizations in a
whole network as:
…primarily nonhierarchical, and participants often have substantial operating autonomy.
Network members can be linked by many types of connections and flows such as
information, materials financial resources, service and social support. Connections may be
informal and totally trust based or more formalized, as through contract (p. 483).
The critical attribute of whole networks for study is structure and process. Again this is
differentiated from past network research that focuses on organizations that compose a
network.
By studying whole networks or the structure and process of inter-organizational
relationships the author can learn a great deal about outputs and outcomes from a network
(Provan et. al.,2007). McGuire (2006) explains, “Growing concerns for determining the
strength and influence of collaborative management [exits] instead of simply documenting
it” (p. 40). This research addresses McGuire (2006) call. The purpose of the dissertation is
to study network level factors that may impact the work of the network itself. Improved
understanding of the impact network level factors has on the work of a network will help to
either prove or disprove common assumptions about networks that are currently
prevalent in the literature.
Network Theory
Koopenjan and Klin (2004) explain “a high density and a variety of organizational
networks characterize society” (p. 3). The authors go on to explain organizational networks
are horizontal relationships (as compared to hierarchies) between organizations formed on
the premise of mutual dependency. Other definitions of organizational networks abound.
Goldsmith and Eggers(2004) using the term “joined up government” explain networks as:
4

“the joining up of various levels and agencies of government to provide more integrated
services” (p 15). O’Toole (1997) describes networks as “structures of interdependence
involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal
subordinate of the other in some larger hierarchical arrangement (p. 47).
Based on these definitions the critical attributes of a network that differentiate it
from some other organizational paradigm are: (1) vertical differentiation and (2)
organizational dependence, the need to work together. Therefore, network theory is
concerned with how individuals or organizations that have a need to work together
organize without hierarchy. Normatively, network theory holds that if the conditions of
non hierarchy and interdependence exist than the production function of the network is
comparatively improved than the production function of an individual or organization
alone. However, not all networks are the same. Networks do not arise for the same
reasons. The level of interdependence and vertical differentiation can vary dramatically.
Therefore, network theory is concerned with explaining how vertical differentiation and
interdependence exist in networks and what impact they may have.
Networks, therefore, are essentially a theory of structural relationships predicated
upon governance. Governance used this way means: “mechanisms for formal coordination”
(Provan and Kenis, 2007, p.230). Just as public administrators have long argued studying
the public sector is different than studying the private sector. Network theorists suggest
studying a network differs than studying a hierarchical organization, but similarities exist,
as well. Knoke (1990) explains: “The basic units of any complex political system are not
individuals, but the positions or roles occupied by social actors and the relationships or

5

connections between these positions” (p.7).O’Toole (1997) explains networks are more
than the sum of nodes and links; they are forms of social organization, interesting in their
own right. Networks from this perspective are concerned with how lines between
organizations are first blurred (descriptive) and then how the blurred lines constitute a
form of relationship that can have an impact upon what is done (whole networks). This is
similar to the structural perspective in organizational theory.
Structure in Networks
Network literature is premised on the importance of structure (Knoke, 1990).
Structural assessments of organization are steeped in the history of organizational theory
beginning with Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy. Bowman and Deal (1997) define structure
as “a blueprint for the patten of expectations and exchanges among internal players
(executives, managers and employees) and external constituencies (such as customers and
clients)…Structural form both enhances and constrains what organizations can accomplish
(p.38-39). They go on to define two classes of structure: vertical coordination and
horizontal coordination. Structural assessments of organizations usually focus on the
impact of these two classes of structure to outputs. Structural assessments of public and
private sector organizations have amassed enormous generation of knowledge (Scott,
1995).
Structure in network analysis is not altogether different. Network analysts seek to
understand the structure of the network. Structure is defined as the study of “patterns of
particular ties between actions, where variation in the network in the existence of strength
of ties is meaningful and consequential” (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992, p. 118). Cool and
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Whitmeyer relate network theory to the “Structralist” position in Sociology, stating: “that
all important social phenomena can be explained primarily, if not completely by social
structure” (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992, 110). How organizations in a network are
structured will have impact upon the work that is done by the network.
Organizations in a network are not operating alone; instead they are operating in
relationship to other organizations. But while networks have claimed to be non
hierarchical, the social and political sciences have long demonstrated that structural
relationships create an uneven distribution of power. This finding has been adopted among
network theorists as well. O’Toole and Meier (2004) write “…political dynamic does not
disappear when agencies operate in a networked contexts; it is likely they are exacerbated”
(p. 690). Hannerman and Riddle (2005), explain how network analysis has come to
incorporate the idea of power, or political relationships into analysis, he states:
the network approach emphasizes that power is inherently relational. An individual does
not have power in the abstract, they have power because they can dominate others -…Because power is a consequence of patterns of relations, the amount of power in social
structures can vary
(http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C10_Centrality.html)
Marsden (1981) similarly describes power in relational terms, focusing on the constraints
and possibilities created by a network structure. The structure of the relationships
between organizations (or actors) will affect the actions that are taken. Therefore while,
non-hierarchy exists in a network, other structural relationships, in a network, will create
imbalances of power as well. Students of network analysis seek to identify and measure
variance between organizations as they relate to the network as a whole. Centrality is a
network level factor that measures relational variance from the strucutralist perspective.
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Centrality
Knoke (1990) explains, “the most central positions in a network are those involving
many reciprocated ties to other actors” (p. 10). Like the top of a hierarchy in a traditional
organization, network centrality of an organization in a network may confer power.
Centrality is based on a formula that reflects the density of an organization. Desnity is a
measure for the number of ties between nodes (organization) in a network (Hannerman
and Riddle, 2005). Density is the ratio between numbers of ties that exist over the number
of total possible ties. Centrality, then, reflects the variance in ties each organization or node
in a network has. However, centrality as a concept can also be expanded to include
information beyond mere number of ties. Centrality can also explain power advantages and
disadvantages in a network that can be represented by giving specific value to the equation
for centrality in an organization. For instance, Cooke and Whitmeyer (1992) define
centrality as “network position –conferred advantage” (p. 120).
Tolbert and Hall (2009) suggest centralization is key dimension of structure in
organizational research. They suggest authors have defined the concept many ways but
“…fundamentally...the concept of centralization refers to the degree to which decision –
making responsibility and power in an organization are closely held by a few elites, or
widely distributed among different organizational members (Tolbert and Hall, 2009, p.37).
Tolbert and Hall (2009) summarize the impact of centralization in much of the
inter-organizational research has having two key advantages, “greater coordination and
faster decision making.” Intergovernmental relations literature has demonstrated
compliance is an outcome from centralization. For instance, Weber (1998) finds a
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relationship between legal compliance and network centrality; more rigid structure and
process led to closer identification of the group with the rules that governed the policy area
in which they were working. Ibarra (1993) finds centrality to be a pivotal dimension in
understanding innovation. Borgatti and Everett (1992) in a review of network literature
mention several other studies in which centralization in a system is identified as important.
However, centrality is not always seen as a positive advantage. Freeman (1979)
purported that an organization with a high number of ties, greater centralization, may in
fact incur greater costs. Etzioni (1975) suggests coercion from the top can alienate
involvement of others and enable the creation of moral involvement (Tolbert and Hall,
2009). Research developed from Etzioni’s perspective has found: when members are
encouraged to participate and actually do participate, they become morally involved
(Tolbert and Hall, 2009). Apparently, the failure to include multiple stakeholder impacts
the effectiveness of the organization. Decentralization as Provan and Kenis (2007) suggest
may make for a more inclusive network in which outputs better represent the will of all
organizations involved.
For this reason, network analysts have come to measure centrality numerous ways,
using both different measures of the concept as well as operationalizng centrality different
in order to give value and or meaning to centrality in a network.
Core Agency Centrality
One meaning or value that has been applied to the measure of centrality is that of
“core agency centrality” or the existence of a lead organization. A lead organization
coordinates “all major network –level activities and key decisions” (Provan and Kenis,
9

2007, p.235). The lead organization provides “administration for network and or facilitates
the activities of members organization in their efforts to achieve network goals” (p. 235)
The lead organization may “underwrite the cost of network administration on its own,
receive resources contribution from network member or seek and control access to
external funding through grants or government funding” (p. 235). The authors go on to
suggest that in this role, often the lead organization has leverage in sharing and recruiting
network members to share their goals. Provan and Milward (1994) find that a lead
organization (or what they call core agency centrality) can serve to better integrate and
coordinate multiple organizations in a network. They state: “centralization appears to
facilitate both integration and coordination, something that decentralized systems have a
difficult time accomplishing because of the number of organizations and linkages involved”
(Provan and Milward 1995, 24). Provan and Milward (2002) find when a core central
agency exists effective collaboration is made much easier. The authors’ analysis
demonstrates that “when influence over mental health decision was highly concentrated in
a single core agency…client outcomes were highest…when influence was highly dispersed
among a number of agencies… effectiveness was lowest” (p. 16). McGuire (2006) explains,
“Instead of a completely flat, self-organizing network, the presence of a lead organization,
acting as system controller or facilitator, is often a critical element of effectiveness in
collaborative management.” (p. 36). Similarly, Arganoff and McGuire (2003) testing
hypothesis in local economic development networks find, lead organizations, with a
diverse board of governors’ leads to more effective collaboration.
My review of centrality suggests three things: (1) centrality can be measured and
operationalized different ways; (2) centrality can be a positive and negative to an
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individual organization in a network and (3) a central organization in a network can have
positive impacts on the work of the network itself. These findings are considered in my
analysis of a single network. Most importantly, centrality is an important concept to
network analysis. Careful attention must be paid when operationalizing and choosing a
measure of centrality and finally, centrality in a network should be explanatory of what a
network does.
Control of Resources
Another common way to operationalize centrality in a network is control of
resources. This view emerges from the theory of resourced dependency first promulgated
by Pheffer and Salancik (1978). Similar to what network theorists hold today, Pheffer and
Salancik (1978) argued that organizations are interdependent; not self –sustaining, they
rely on other organizations. This assumption is similar to network theorists’ assumption of
organizational interdependency. The condition of interdependency causes organizations to
seek to manage their control of resources. That is, when organizations are working
together they will try to insure a stable flow of resources to continue their own
autonomous operation. Therefore, organizations in a network that can maintain a stable
flow of critical resources will gain a central position in the organization. Much of resource
dependencies core assumptions have been incorporated into network theory. Networks
scholar often measure the collaboration of networks, through the flow of financial
resources (Gulati, 2001).
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Hierarchy
Another dimension of centrality that can exist in a network is hierarchy. Hierarchy
in a network is slightly different than hierarchy in a traditional organization or
bureaucratic analyses. Hierarchy is based on the scalar principal. The scalar principal holds
that authority should be held at the top of an organization and responsibility should flow
vertically from the top of the organization (Starling, 2008). A critical component of
hierarchy is authority, the inherent right of someone in a managerial role in the
organization to tell others what to do, and coordinate their activities (Starling, 2008).
Hierarchy in a network is similar in that some networks will grant authority to certain
organizations in a network. Hierarchy is dissimilar in a network because no actual vertical
differentiation or practice of the scalar principal exists.
Hierarchy in a network is concerned with how organizations in a network have both
differentiated and ranked roles. That is not only do some organization have more ties that
others (centrality) or a specific central purpose (lead organization) but their role within in
the network can also have a rank (hierarchy). Hierarchy exists when some organization in a
network has a legitimized or authoritative rank in the network. Their advantage is not
based on ties but on a value given to the organization itself. Hierarchy in this way is related
to both centrality as a conferred advantage and the existence of sub-groups within a
network.
Empirical findings regarding hierarchy in networks are mixed. Arganoff (2007) in a
finds networks with hierarchy may find it difficult to get cooperation from all parties. In a
study of a network of virtual organizations hierarchy was pervasive, in contrast to what
12

was expected. Hierarchy also seemed to impact perceptions of the network itself. The
authors explain perceived performance as compared to objective performance was
increased when hierarchy existed. That is, while networks may be a more common way to
structure, individuals seem to still rely on the institution of hierarchy as a way of conferring
information and maintaining legitimacy (Ahuja and Carley, 1998). Moynihan (2005) finds
networks in emergency management that have some level of hierarchy can be effective.
The review of hierarchy in literature shows, that while the classical model of
organizations has demonstrated the value of hierarchy, hierarchy does have consequences,
including buy in from participants, which is important in a network. The existence of
hierarchy in a network is expected to have an impact on the work of the network itself.
Goal Congruence
Another structural relationship that this dissertation seeks to explore is goal
congruence. Are the goals of organizations in relation to other organizations in the network
similar or dissimilar? Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) claim goal congruence is one of the
challenges of networks. They explain, “Achieving goal congruence in the public sector is not
so simple” (p. 40). While networks may form for a purpose, multiple organizations may
view the purpose and the actions needed to serve that purpose very differently. Public
sector organizations already commonly suffer from goal incongruence and or goal
ambiguity, having multiple public organizations only exacerbate this challenge. Goldsmith
and Eggers (2004) state:
Government networks…tend to form to deliver they type of service whose outcomes
are sometime unclear, are difficult to measure and may take years to realize To
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complicate matters, networks often bring together actors whose goal
simultaneously overlap and differ (p 40-41).
The difficulty of achieving goal congruence in networks was easily summarized by Cyert
and March (1963) who state: “people (i.e. individuals) have goals; collectives of people do
not” (p. 26). More recently, McGuire (2006) asked the question “how networked” (p.36)?
Essentially he is questioning how collaborative organizations in a network really are.
McGuire (2006) purports goal congruence as measure of the collaborativeness of networks.
Goal congruence as an organization level variable in private sector and public sector
literature is often discussed and measured. Provan and Kenis (2007) suggest Perrow
(1961) and Ven de Ven (1976) laid groundwork for considering goal congruence (what
they call goal consensus) as significant factor in better performance, in spite of conflict.
However, they suggest network literature has had a slightly different focus when it comes
to the study of goal congruence in networks.
In a seminal study by Bougouis (1980), he hypothesizes a relationship between goal
congruence, among top managers in private organizations, and high performance.
Disagreement about goals was hypothesized to cause low performance. Data supported
the hypotheses: Higher performance existed among the organizations in which mangers
agreed about goals. Building on these finding other authors have demonstrated similar
relationships between goal congruence and performance in the private sector (See:
Schwenk and Cossier, 1993). The relations between goal congruence and the outputs of the
organization (as assessed in this dissertation) were examined by Shamely and Cora (1992)
in a study of private organizations. The authors find when goals are similarly viewed
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within an organization there is an impact on what is done in the organization. That is by
clearly limiting the goals of an organization the outputs more clearly reflect those goals.
The value of goal congruence in the public sector has also been often evaluated. For
instance, Fernandez and Rainey (2006) purport the importance of clear, shared goals to
organizational change in the public sector. In a study of public schools, goal congruence
between teachers and teachers and administration were tested. The authors hypothesized
goal congruence both vertically and horizontally would be positively associated with job
satisfaction. Their findings were supported by the data (Vancouver and Schmitt, 2006).
More related to network analysis are the findings of O’Toole (2003) who suggests
goal congruence is an important antecedent to cooperative behavior when multiple
organization are charged with the implementation of a public policy. Schmidt and Kochan
(1977) positively associate goal compatibility with cooperation in a study of local offices of
the US Training and Employment Service. In a study of joint ventures (a type of network
structure) made by private firms in Japan, Beamish and Delios (in Beamish and Killing,
1997) find joint ventures in which goal congruence among the organizations were more
highly appraised than those in which the organization did not have the same goals.
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) allude to issues of goal congruence in the implementation
network for the HUD HOPE IV. They claim goal incongruence has inhibited overall
effectiveness. Network scholars Provan and Kenis (2007) also suggest the importance of
goal consensus. But their works is conceptual; measuring goal consensus in a network
eludes them. What they do however suggest is that goal consensus can both be a positive
and negative attribute of a network. They explain:
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Consistent with early work by Van de Ven (1976) on domain similarity, when there
is general consensuses on broad network level goals, both regarding goal content
and process, and in the absence of hierarchy, network participants are more likely
to be involved and committed to the network and more likely to work together. This
does not necessarily mean that the goals of network members must be similar. In
fact, similarity of purpose can result in difficulties in working together, especially
when competitive pressures make network organization reluctant to cooperate and
share information (Park 1996) (Provan and Kenis, 2007, p. 239).
They go on to suggest that while goal congruence is important structural aspect of a
network, negative aspects of goal congruence can be managed or governed through other
structural arrangements.
In this study goal congruence is assessed for the purpose of understanding both if
goal congruence exists in a network as well as how goal congruence impacts what is done.
Goal congruence based on the literature has both negative and positive consequences for
what is done in the network. Mostly, I focus on the positive impact of goal congruence
expecting higher goal congruence to be associated with outputs that are similar to the
purpose of the network itself. However, the next network level factors, competition helps
to better understand some of the netagive consequences of goal congruence.
Competition
Organizations don’t’ always collaborate; often they compete, even when their goals
are the same as other organizations. Axelrod (1997) stated there is great complexity to
cooperation. Much of that complexity is due to competition that occurs in the process of
collaborating. He says: “expansion of the potential forms of collaboration implies the
expansion of the potential forms of competition” (xiii). Similarly, Goldsmith and Eggers
(2004) explain: “goal incongruence also occurs when government activates a network but
also competes against parts of the network” (p. 42) Competition, it appears is intrinsic to
16

collaboration and is therefore likely to emerge in networks. Katz (1964) explained often
when two units have similar or overlapping functions they will begin to compete. Wright
(1988), an inter-governmental relations scholar, offers a model of inter-governmental
relations called the overlapping authority model. He explains: substantial areas of
authority are vested among the vertical dimensions of the American federal system.
Differentiation in the autonomy of agencies and the power and influence of individuals
within the system all exist. Competition is one result of overlapping authority.
Research on local governments has identified similar relationships. Feiock’s (2004)
collection of empirical articles in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition and
Cooperation demonstrate that while cooperation between local governments is becoming
common, competition among local governments also exists. Local economic development
policy is shown to be a substantive policy arena that requires collaboration but often
fosters an environment of competition. Arganoff’s (2006) study of 14 networks, he found
conflicts over:
…Agency- turf, the contribution of resources, staff time devoted, to the network, the
location of meetings and conferences, and most importantly threats of withdrawal because
of frustration over the time and effort expended to achieve results (p. 61).
He states when conflicts exist special attention must be paid to the design of the agency to
insure competition (zero-sum losses) is not created.
Like goal congruence, competition among the organizations of a network can impact
organizational relations with other networks, or the structure of the network. Interestingly,
the normative qualifications for networks do not suggest the existence of competition.
However, as just explained competition is intrinsic to collaboration. Therefore assessing
17

competition in networks while rarely done has often been alluded too. Bazzoli et. al. (1998)
demonstrates variation in the collaborativeness of networks exists. Similarly, Freid et al.
(1998) demonstrate contextual factors of networks, other than collaborative effort can
impact network behavior and network outputs. More specifically, competition in a network
can significantly limit its productivity (Arganoff, 2007).
Competition as a network level factor is expected to exist as well as impact what is
done by the network. Competition is expected to an extent to have positive benefits but too
much competition can result in the failure of the network to do what it intends to do.
Review
Centrality and its several operationlizations (core agency and control of resources),
hierarchy, goal congruence and competition are the network level variables that this
dissertation will use to explain what a network does. They are all founded in a theory of
networks. Network theory is based on structural relationships; how organizations relate to
each other or how their relations are structured will impact what is done. These variables
assess concepts that will impact how organizations relate to each other. There is one
control variable, premised on network theory that is included as well. This is next
reviewed.
Strategic Orientation
Inherent to the definition of networks is the concepts that organizations join a
network to do something they could not do alone. That is, networks are purposeful. Having
a specific purpose creates a strategic origination. For instance, networks may exist for
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conserving a resource or providing a specific service. Once they have a goal a strategy helps
the networks to define a strategic orientation. Strategic orientation is defined here as: “The
pattern of action through which organizations propose to achieve desired goal, modify
current goals or realize opportunities (Rubin, 1998, p. 88). In other words a strategy is just
a plan for producing outputs. However an organization or network has choices about their
strategy. And as purported earlier often within their public sector when multiple and or
ambiguous goals exist the strategic origination of t a network s can vary. The strategic
orientation is the choice a network makes about in order to produce an output.
Typologies defining networks have exhumed in the literature that are clearly related
to defining the strategic orientation of a network. For instance, Arganoff (2007) explains,
“not all networks are alike.” In a case study of 12 networks, Arganoff defines four types of
networks: Informational, developmental, outreach and action. A methodology for
differentiating the types of networks he studies is not made explicit. However, based on the
definitions provided, the typology of networks types is made based on the purpose of the
network: Why was the network founded and what do network members do as part of the
network. Arganoff’s typologies of types of networks is similar to that of Provan and
Milward (2006). Provan and Milward (2006) define four types of networks: service
implementation, information diffusion, problem solving and community capacity building.
Again, the typology is based on purpose of the networks. In defining what type of network
it is or the purpose of the strategy the authors have suggested that networks that have
different purpose will behave differently. Normatively if the network is structured
horizontally and the purpose for joining and the interdependency clear the strategic
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orientation will be the one that increases the production function of the network the
greatest.
However, as McGuire (2002) explains, strategic orientation is not so easily defined.
He states strategic orientation is “…a complicated environmental factor” (p 606), that
concerns “the multiple and sometime conflicting purposes for which networks exist” (p.
606). Provan and Milward (2002) complement McGuire (2002) perspective on the impacts
of a complicated strategic orientation. Because there is variance in the structural
relationship of networks, and the purpose of the networks may be unclear or many there is
need to define and control for the orientation of a network.
The Network to be Studied: The Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act
The Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act (SNPLMA) of 1998 was passed
by the 105th Congress with the express objective: “to provide for the orderly disposal of
certain Federal lands in Clark County, Nevada, and to provide for the acquisition of
environmentally sensitive lands in the State of Nevada” (S 25, 1998). Monies from sale of
lands were put into a special account for the acquisition of land as well as to provide for:
capital improvements in enumerated areas,
development and implementation of a multi-species habitat conservation
plan,
general conservation,
implementation and management of the Act,
multijurisdictional hazardous fuels reduction and wildfire prevention plans,
and to carry out the
Eastern Nevada Landscape Restoration Project. (S 25, 1998)
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The legislation, between 1998 and 2008, generated $3,335,172,114 in revenue from the
sale of Federal, public lands (Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act:10-Year
Report to Congress, 2008).
Specifically, the piece of legislation arises out of a particular need for regional action
in southern Nevada. A large portion (80%) of land in Nevada is owned by the federal
government. In 1998 rapid growth in the urban center of southern Nevada (Las Vegas)
was being hampered by an inability to grow outwards.
The legislation came about in order to allow for contiguous growth of Las Vegas. The
legislation allowed for the sale of federally owned lands that blocked the development of
urban centers in Southern Nevada. Auctions were held to allow for the purchase by the
public and private sector of the federal lands. Monies from the sale of lands were then
placed into special accounts for the generally stated purpose to conserve other lands in the
region. In this unique case the private sector, federal management agencies, local
jurisdictions and special regional districts were brought together in new ways and for new
reasons.
The case will focus on the set of projects that fall under the enumerated legislative
intent of allowing local jurisdictions and regional actors to acquire funds for the purpose of
creating parks, trails and natural areas (PTNA). The PTNA subgroup was founded in order
to nominate, review and fund projects. A process from nomination to funding was created
that would incorporate multiple organizations in a three step review process. Over 10
years 168 projects have been funded totaling over $500 million in public funds.
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Operations and Measurements
Operationalizing a variable means finding a measurable, quantifiable, and valid
index for your variable (http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/pe/hp602web/HP602VA14.htm,
5/26/2011). This section of the paper will discuss how each variable is operationalized for
the purpose of analysis.
Dependant Variable: Projects
The dependant variable in this analysis is outputs, the actual work of the network
(Lynn et. al., 2001). Outputs for the purpose of quantitative measurement are the total
number of projects that were nominated and then adjudicated upon during the approval
process. During that process a number of projects were not approved for funding. As
stated prior the purpose of this analysis is to understand why those projects were
approved or not approved. Therefore while the total number of projects is the dependant
variable the purpose will be to differentiate between approved and not approved projects.
Approved projects, as identified on the SNPLMA main webpage are coded as 1. Non
approved projects, as identified, are coded as 0.
Strategic Orientation
In order to control for the strategic orientation of projects, which we know may be a
causal factor in some projects being approved over others strategic orientation is
operationalized. Each project is classified as having a strategic orientation. Four possible
strategic orientations that can be assigned to a project are based on the ranking document
first listed in the Implementation Agreement and then used year to year by the network to
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evaluate projects. The four strategic orientations include: Demand, Resource Protection,
Connectivity and Cost and Value of Investment.
In order to assign a strategic orientation to each project, the scoring sheets provided
by the BLM, Las Vegas Field Office were reviewed. The raw scores given to each project (by
the organizations in the network) for each of the four criterion were calculated as
percentages.1 Then, the percent value each organization gave to a project was averaged.
The averages for each criterion were compared. The average highest percent value a
project was given in one of the four criteria became the projects strategic orientation.
For example: Project A is assigned raw scores in each of four criteria by several
organizations
Criteria 1

Criteria 2

Criteria 3

Criteria 4

Organization 1

4/18 = 22%

11/18 =61%

4/9 = 66%

6/9

Organization 2

9/18 =5%

12/18 = 66%

3/9 = 77%

7/9

Organization 3

6/19 =33%

17/18=55%

4/9 = 88%

8/9

Average

35%

74%

62%

77%

Therefore, Project A would be assigned a strategic orientation value of 4 as an ordinal
dummy value. Strategic orientation will also be used as a control value in regression 1
(approved not approved)

1

Calculating percentages first was necessary because the raw scores that could be assigned to each project varied.
By first computing percentages the original bias in raw score values was eliminated.
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Independent Variables
Centralization
Centrality is measured by the formula: The total number of ties that any node has
compared to other node ties. Greater centralization means more nodes are connected to
one organization than any other in the network. Several ways of defining ties were used to
give different meaning to the centralization measure.
First, data was coded based on the organizations that voted together during the
process from nomination to approval. As noted in Chapter X, organizations were part of
the network to approve parks, trails and natural area in Southern Nevada. However, the
Implementation Agreement specified a process for approving these projects that called for
organizations to vote on each project. Not all organization voted at the same time. Note,
“together” means at the same time; not the same way on a project. Voting together is a
measure of “general organizational linkages” (Provan and Milward, 1995). Voting together
suggests members from the organization were present at same time and same place. They
would receive similar guidance and information and be privy to any current debates.
Voting together was identified by reviewing the Implementation Agreement . The groups
that voted together were sent to a representative at the BLM Las Vegas field office involved
in the administration of SNPLMA for review. A follow up email was received from the
PTNA subgroup manager on April 25, 2011 that clarified which organization voted
together.
If an organization voted together during the process they were given a 1 if they did
not vote together they were given a 0. For example a value of “1” in the intersection of row
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A and column B indicates organization A and B voted together, whereas a “0” indicates they
did not vote together.
Example:
A
B
C
D
A
0
1
1
1
B
1
0
1
1
C
1
1
0
1
D
1
1
1
0
In this example all of the organizations listed voted together during the process of
nomination to review.
The data is put into a squared or binary matrix. Data from the squared matrix is
then used to compute degree centrality. Each organization is given a degree centrality
score. The higher the degree score the more central the node or organization to the whole
network. Greater centralization means more nodes are connected to one organization than
any other in the network. The degree centrality scores will be used in the regression
analysis.
However, ties do not completely capture the concept of centralization in a network.
Provan and Milward (1995) in a study of a community of human services agencies
identified a core agency through qualitative analysis. They then used quantitative measure
to verify that the agency they believed was central was statistically central, as well. Their
methodology for proving the existence of a core central agency is as follows:
First, the identified that they believed there was a core agency and why.
Then, they measured density of the network, with and without the core
agency included. A significant difference (using: ) was found between the
density of the network with and without the core agency. This means, the
number of possible linkages is significantly impacted by the core agency.
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Then, they calculated the mean score of all links from other nodes to the cre
agency. They found that very few agencies had less than 4 links to the core
agency.
They also calculated overall network density with and without the central
agency. They found density decreased significantly when the core agency
was not present. Meaning the core agency was connecting many of the nodes.
The authors then used this information to create a scale of integration: decentralized,
moderately decentralized, centralized, highly centralized (Provan and Milward, 1995).
Like, Provan and Milward (1995) I too believe there is evidence of a core central
agency (this may be easily identified using the first operationalization of centrality but it
may not, so just in case…). The Bureau of Land Management, Las Vegas Field Office, is the
only organization involved that has a staff member that is solely tasked with the
administration of PTNA. All documentation is housed at the BLM, Las Vegas Field Office. All
publications of PTNA material is made done through the BLM, Las Vegas Field office. In this
way, the Las Vegas Field Office is very much like the Provan and Milward (1995) core
central agency/ I will use the same statistical process for identifying the centrality of the
BLM Las Vegas Field Office.
The third operationalizaiton of centrality is the control of resources. Data on the
number of dollars an organization received in each round was collected. The data is put
into a square matrix and used to measure organizational centrality as control over
resources. In comparison to other agencies, organizations that collected more dollars are
more central. Coefficients were than given to each organization in each round and used in
the regression analysis.
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Hierarchy/subgroups
Hierarchy or the differentiated rank of organizations in the network were identified
through content analysis of the Implementation Agreements. As stated earlier found
subgroups emerged. A scale of the rank 1-4 was created based on the rank of the
organization in the network. Each organization was assigned a value as attribute data in the
original centrality formula. In the final regression a dummy variable for being part of one
of the ranked subgroups is used to explain outputs.
Goal consensus
Goal consensus is operationalized by change in projects to be funded in each year
among subgroups in the network. Projects are approved or not approved in each subgroup
the number of projects that change status in each subgroup is used as a measure of goal
consensus – do the subgroups concede that projects that are approved by one subgroup are
the same as the other subgroups. The project is the goal. The more agreement the greater
the goal consensus.
A second measure of goal consensus is also assessed however it cannot be used in
the regression analysis, only as a descriptive to help better understand the network. As
noted, only some organizations in the network actually ranked projects using the criterion.
Differences in how organizations viewed each project is the second measure of goal
consensus. A standard deviation for the raw score totals for each project, for each
organization is calculated.
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Competition
If an organization has a project nominated in the same year as another organization
they are said to be in competition with each other. Two scales for competition are created
and assessed for fit in the model: (1) competition based on number of dollars being vied for
and (2) competition based on number of projects being vied for. The two scales are
constructed using break points identified by looking at the range. Then the numbers are
entered into a squared matrix. If two organizations are in heavy competition they are given
a 3… Then a score is given for each organization that is a measure of how in competition
they were with other organization relative to the competiveness of other organizations.
The scores are then used in regression analysis.
The Model
Following the use of network analysis to compute coefficients that measure
concepts of organizational structure a logit regression is used to find if network level
factors predict approved verse not approved projects. The equation is as follows:
Projects (approved/not approved) = centrality, hierarchy, goal consensus, competition,
strategic orientation.
Conclusion
This paper presents an outline for the study of network level factors impact on th work ot a
network, outputs. The network created to implement aspects of the federal legislations
singed in 1998, The Southern Nevada Public Lands Management Act, is used to
operationalize variables. This research is t be carried out within the year.
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